Subjectivity and Agency

The second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason is often interpreted as either a tweaking of, or a shifting of emphasis in, the system presented in the first.  However, there are also indications of a more radical variation, verging on an entirely different doctrine.  Between the two editions, Kant produces both a theory of Practical Reason, and one of Natural Science, each of which studies an entity which is dynamic.  Thus, his repeated interest, articulated exclusively in the second edition, in examples of the self-cognition of a corporeally active subject, may be more than coincidental, i. e. may reflect the results of his more recent research.  Those examples illustrate the concept of a Subject of Experience that is not merely one to which objects conform, but, one which is, furthermore, in motion, thereby suggesting an analogous variation on the standard interpretation of the 'Copernican revolution', as has been previously discussed here.  So, what is nascent, even if not fully developed, in the second edition, is a concept of dynamic Subjectivity, i. e. of Agency, that is in contrast with not only that of the static Subjectivity of the first edition, but with the privileged status of the detached observed that dominates Philosophy both before and after the Critique of Pure Reason.  Now, Agency entails an irreducible motile factor, with which any cognitive factor, beginning with Proprioception, is fundamentally coordinated, a coordination that, therefore, conditions any theory of Consciousness, and of Knowledge.  So, even if Kant verges on a concept of Agency, his adherence to a concept of Space that is suited to passive observation, not to motility, shows that his concept of Subjectivity, as innovative as it is, ultimately remains rooted in tradition.