Attraction, Sympathy, Reason

The contemporary emphasis on Epistemology has obscured how for Kant 'Rationalism' is not only a Cognitive orientation, in contrast with 'Empiricism', but a Moral one, as well, in contrast with 'Sentimentalism'.  Now, Sympathy, the fundamental principle of the predominant Sentimentalist doctrine of the era, i. e. Hume's, as unifying different people, is, plainly, an attractive force.  So, insofar as Kant rejects the suitability of Sympathy as a foundation of Morality, because it entails the possibility of ignoble behavior as occasioning compassion, e. g. when a criminal commiserates with an arrested associate, he conceives his Rational principle as capable of resisting the pull of a sympathetic feeling.  But, such resistance is effected by an attractive force in the opposite direction, i. e. inwardly.  In other words, for Kant, Reason can function as an attractive dynamic natural force.