Deservedness, General Will, Monarchy

Kant's argument that Reason requires a synthesis of Virtue and Happiness does not suffice to establish that that synthesis is constituted by a relation of Deservedness.  One possible independent proof of the latter is based on the relation of proportionality entailed by Deservedness--insofar as Proportionality is equivalent to Ratio, with the latter, arguably, a mode of Reason, Deservedness is a rational concept.  Now, proportionality presupposes the commensurability of its terms, and the only indication of the commensurability of Virtue and Happiness in Kant's exposition is that the former entails self-constraint, and, hence, a sacrifice of happiness.  It follows that Deservedness for Kant is compensation, as the Utilitarians suspect.  Now, insofar as Reason requires the possibility of divine intervention to effect such compensation, the arc of Kant's exposition of Practical Reason, from the Groundwork, to the 2nd Critique, to Religion, constitutes a critique of Rousseau's concept of Democracy.  For, Kantian Practical Reason begins as a representation of Rousseau's General Will, which is the basis of the latter's concept of Democracy.  So, if a Kingdom, with a deity as its monarch, emerges as the ideal collectivity according to that Reason,, Kant's exposition serves to demonstrate that a such a Monarchy serves as a corrective to the flaws of that Democracy.