Proprioception, Ghost in the Machine, Natural Science

Kant's apparent inattention to Proprioception might reflect his agreement with the thesis, common to his era, that its object, sometimes characterized as 'the ghost in the machine', is non-empirical, and, hence, is not the object of a cognition that can be classified as 'perceptual'.  Regardless, contemporary neuro-psychology, by ascertaining the presence of a cerebral 'homunculus' image, reinforces the thesis that Proprioception is an actual empirical cognitive faculty.  If so, then Kant's 'foundation' of the Natural Sciences is physical, not metaphysical.  For, as has been previously discussed, in his system, mechanical forces are derived from dynamical ones, the cognition of which presupposes the awareness, in the observer, of repulsive forces, i. e. presupposes Proprioception.