Reason, Sympathy, Depersonalization

Kant's emphasis on the deontological aspects of his doctrine--universalization, duty for duty's sake, a categorical imperative, etc.--tends to reinforce the popular reputation, based on the self-evident privacy of feelings, of Reason as a depersonalizing faculty.  In contrast, the representation of Reason and Sympathy as forces illustrates, to the contrary, that it is Sympathy that depersonalizes, while it is Reason that empowers, the individual.  For, as has been previously argued here, Sympathy is a trans-personal attractive force, which Reason, as an intrapersonal attractive force, can counter.  Furthermore, the apparently impersonal universalization effected by Reason has been shown to actually be the product of an intrapersonal repulsive force.  In other words, the source of Reason is within the individual, while that of Sympathy is external to it, on this representation of them.  Now, Kant attempts to make the same point regarding that distinction with his Autonomy-Heteronomy contrast.  However, the vestigial supernaturalism of his doctrine, which entails that Reason is a mysterious visitation, only undercuts that effort, thereby reinforcing the popular reputation.