Morality, Imitating, Following

At #32 of the Critique of Judgment, Kant distinguishes "following" an example from "imitating" one.  Later, at #47 and #49 he proposes that the former does not entail the implementation of a determinate rule, thereby implying that the latter does.  So, insofar as the adoption of his principle of Pure Practical Reason is interpreted, as it most prevalently is, as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as an instance of a determinate universal law, that adoption 'imitates' the principle.  In contrast, insofar as, as has been proposed here, it is interpreted as entailing the concept of a maxim of conduct as setting an example, that adoption 'follows' the principle.  Likewise, the formulation of a rival Moral principle, e. g. that of Utilitarianism, can be interpreted as, paradoxically, 'following' Kant's example.