Will, Voluntary, Imperative

Central to Kant's doctrine is the distinction between a 'categorical' and a 'hypothetical' imperative--the adoption of the former can be only 'free', while that of the latter can be only 'unfree'. The unfreedom of the adoption of a hypothetical imperative derives, according to Kant, from the predetermination of the purpose that motivates it. In contrast, according to the Formaterial model of Experience, and the definition of 'voluntary', the acting on the basis of an adopted imperative is always voluntary, for a variety of reasons that have been previously discussed, starting with its thesis that Will, i. e. Motility is a principle that is independent of any other experiential factors. The contrast also illustrates the unwieldiness of the strict 'freedom-unfreedom' dichotomy that Kant inherits from Hume, if not from tradition, in general. Even granting that one is unfree to resist the drives that are the sources of one's purposes, as Kant seemingly agrees, the choice of means to those ends is free, so, to that extent, the adoption of a hypothetical imperative is also free. Thus, that adoption, on Kant's own interpretation of it, combines free and unfree elements, with the reductionism of the dichotomy forcing him to ultimately classify it as unfree, as a reflection of which element is the predominant one. In contrast, the 'more voluntary'-less voluntary' spectrum that has been proposed here more flexibly characterizes the adoption of a hypothetical imperative as simply 'less voluntary' than that of a categorical imperative.