Will, Doubt, God

Descartes' eventual assertion that God is not a deceiver, leaves his previous Doubting without a divine source. In other words, his proof that God is the cause of his existence does not suffice as a proof of that God is the cause of his self-evident ability to originally doubt that God is not a deceiver. In contrast, Spinoza distinguishes God qua natura naturans from God qua creator of Modes, and Nietzsche distinguishes Dionysus from Apollo. Common to each of the former of the two pairs is that they entail volition, in one sense or another. Likewise, Cartesian Doubting is a mode of Will, as defined here--a process of diverging from the given, which, as has been previously discussed is accurately expressed in the literal meaning of 'cogito', i. e. 'I activate myself'. However, here, Will is a special case of the Material Principle of the system, whereas, without a demonstration of how doubting the honesty of God is a gift of God, Cartesian doubting remains impious.