Will, Doubt, Aporia

Descartes' demonstration of the unreliability of the senses is easily interpreted as a continuation of the Platonist tradition. However, a more careful examination of his philosophical DNA suggests a different genealogy. His 'I am certain that I am a doubting being' is more immediately akin to Socrates' 'I know that I know nothing', which might have become more generally recognized if he, too, had maintained his original impiety, i. e. doubting theological dogma, in the face of a likely stake-burning. Entailed in that recognition is a possible comparison of Cartesian Doubt with Socratic Aporia, revealing, for example, the former as an active version of the latter. It also involves the reminder that the immediate matter of Cartesian Knowledge is the process of Doubting, i. e. that the foundation of Knowledge is Will, the source of Doubting.