Will and Immortality of the Soul

Despite his thesis of Mind-Body Parallelism, which holds that to every mental sequence there is a corresponding physical sequence, Spinoza allows for the survival of at least some ideas in a Mode on the occasion of corporeal death. However, he does not similarly acknowledge the survival of at least some bodily parts, each of which has its own 'mind', on that occasion, e. g. the skeleton. Thus lacking in his argument that Mind survives corporeal death, is any elaboration of the possessive pronoun, e. g. 'our', with which he qualifies 'Mind', thereby avoiding a possible trivialization of the purportedly most profound moment in his doctrine. In contrast, here, possession is a product of what has previously been called 'propriation', i. e. the process of interiorization effected by Comprehension. On that model, as has been previously discussed, the immediate matter of Comprehension is always Will, i. e. Motility. In other words, here, possession is a relation that is peculiar to a specific combination of the Formal and the Material principles of the system, namely, to the Comprehension-Will combination that constitutes Personhood. Thus, in contrast with Spinoza's line of reasoning, from the fact that possessiveness is the product of a combination of instances of impersonal processes, it does not follow that it transcends that combination, i. e. it does not follow that the combination that the produces it is a priori 'one's own', a point made in other terms by Kant, Heidegger, and Sartre, among others.