Will and Soul

Descartes' characterization of 'thinking being' as 'mind' or 'soul' constitutes, conversely, a re-definition of the traditional concepts of the latter. At the same time, the term that he uses for it, 'animus', perhaps inadvertently indicates that he is less conscientious than are his philosophical and theological forerunners in explaining how mind animates body, e. g. the Meditations lacks any discussion of Motility. Deriving 'I think' from 'Agito', i. e. from 'I activate' is a promising step in providing such an explanation, but one that is ultimately abortive insofar as he adheres to a separation of mind and body. In contrast, for example, Will, the principle of Motility here, is a unitary process that originates mentally and eventuates physiologically, i. e. is a process that is prior to any mind-body severance. Thus, while Descartes' concept of soul is innovative, it is also enervated.