Will and Other as End-in-itself

Kant sometimes conceives an other as an 'end-in-itself', the promotion of whose happiness is one's duty, a duty which one does not have towards oneself. This concept is the product of a questionable teleological representation of Freedom, beginning with an inference from the prohibition of interference in Freedom, to the obligation to promote the happiness of the possessor of Freedom, i. e. that of a rational agent. On empirical grounds alone, the inference is invalid, because the promotion of the happiness of an other can sometimes support their Freedom, e. g. the provision of food can strengthen them, but can, on other occasions, amount to the same indulgence that seems to be Kant's reason for not obligating one to promote one's own happiness. More likely, the inference is based on his thesis that a rational agent 'deserves' Happiness, a thesis which, as has been argued previously, questionably presupposes that the happiness of an individual is of interest to impersonal Reason. So, absent the admirable but unconvincing teleological interpretation of Freedom, an other, to Kant, is a self-activating entity, i. e. is a possessor of Will.