Will, Phenomenon, Thing-in-Itself

According to the model of Experience being developed here, a phenomenon represents immediately an encounter of Will with some object to it. Hence, the proper characterization of a basic phenomenal datum is 'I have encountered something', not, as is traditionally the case, some quality. Further refinement of that basic datum often yields a proposition in which a constructed 'object' serves as the logical subject. Now, it is easy to conceive that the actual object of an encounter is modified by the encounter, e. g. an ice cube will immediately begin to melt when touched by a warmer finger. Hence, it is unproblematic to distinguish an object qua 'appearance' in an encounter from that qua 'in-itself', i. e. from its condition outside of the context of an encounter. In other words, on this model, a phenomenon is neither equivalent to an appearance nor does it represent a thing-in-itself. This concept of a phenomenon plainly diverges from that of most Phenomenalisms, and, seemingly from Kantianism, as well. On the other hand, that the product of Kantian cognitive processes is a proposition, not a thing, suggests the possibility that this concept is implicit in that system.