Will and In-the-World

Also problematic for Heidegger's notion 'being-in-the-world' is the 'in'. For, its implication that all experience is intra-mundane seems to preclude the possibility of the private features, i. e. 'one's ownmost possibilities', that are central to his doctrine. In contrast, here, a 'world', as a totality of phenomena, is antecedent to the Comprehension of it, i. e. what is represented necessarily precedes the representation of it. Hence, such a totality has been interiorized by a subject, as part of its immediate past, as one's own world. On the other hand, Will is the exteriorizing principle of Experience that, in its encounters with other entities, exceeds its given world. In other words, Will is always outside a world, and, so, one is never currently 'in' a world. The contrast demonstrates that with the 'in' of 'being-in-the-world', Heidegger's ambition to challenge the traditional concept of a possible purely private experience, e. g. Leibniz' Monadism, overshoots its mark, i. e. it precludes any private dimension whatsoever.