Swerve, Tyche, Pragmatism

Probably the closest Modern equivalent of Lucretian Swerve is Peirce's concept of Tyche, i. e. Chance, though there is little evidence of any awareness of his of the precursor.  One structural distinction between the two is that in Swerve, the transition from regularity to irregularity is emphasized, while Peirce is interested in the inverse, though any concept of randomness presupposes antecedent uniformity.  Now, Peirce bases his concept of Pragmatism on Tychism, and not on mere Humean Skepticism, which questions the independence of future events from past regularities without attributing objective deviation to them.  Consequently, instead of merely suspending Certainty, he proposes, as a positive alternative to the latter Epistemological criterion, Probability, always provisional.  Hence, Pragmatism accommodates the possibility of Chance that is common to Swerve and Tyche, i. e. formulates a method of Technical control that respects the ever present possibility of eluding it.