Material Causality and Skepticism

The concept of Material Causality is not affected by two well-known expressions of Skepticism.  The first is Hume's, according to which Causal Connection is no more than a Constant Conjunction.  But that analysis does not apply to Material Causality, which can obtain in a single sequence, without any generality attributed.  Rather, as Deleuze has shown, any sequence of terms, even a repetition, involves differentiation in some respect, even merely numerical, and, so, instantiates Material Causality.  Indeed, Hume's own concept of a Conjunction is nothing but one such sequence, and, so, his Skepticism presupposes Material Causality.  Second, a more recent analysis, presented, for other purposes, by both Wittgenstein and Goodman, implies that a variation is indistinguishable from a fulfillment, in which case, Material Causality is indistinguishable from Teleological Causality.  But a fulfillment, e. g. maturation, still entails a distinction between an earlier phase and a later phase, and, hence, entails Material Causality.  So, since there are sequences in which what is dubious is the conception of the later term as a completion of the earlier, and not merely its successor, Teleological Causality is a special case of Material Causality, and not contrary to it.  So, such Skepticism accepts Material Causality, even if it does not recognize it as such.