Material Causality and Creativity

Philosophers seem to have struggled with the concept of Creativity.  For example, none of the various attempts to reconcile Philosophy with the Abrahamic Theological tradition, including Spinoza's, begins with the foundational premise of Genesis--divine creation.  Kant tacitly acknowledges Creativity in his concept of Genius, but only as a process that requires constraint, i. e. by Taste.  Nietzsche could replace Schopenhauer's Will to Live with a Will to Create, and possibly does in the few passages in which it is presented as a Will to Empowerment.  But the predominant treatment of his replacement is as a Will to Overpower, thereby obscuring the original potential of a Will to Create.  Now, Creativity is an explicit feature of Whitehead's system, though it is eventually subordinated to its final phase, Concrescence.  Still, that shift of focus is instructive.  For, it reflects the limits of Whitehead's conceptual resources--Efficient Causality and Teleological Causality--which impose upon Creativity an emphasis on its first and last phases, to the neglect of the process as a whole.  Instead, Creativity can be recognized as a diversification of given circumstances, and, hence, as exemplifying Material Causality, as defined here, with Formal Causality the complementary source of any internal coherence.  So, the traditional inadequacy of Philosophy to the concept of Creativity is perhaps a concrete correlate of its unawareness, beginning with Aristotle, of the concept of Material Causality