Matter and Causality

Aristotle conceives Matter as inherently inert.  Nevertheless, he seems unaware that it follows that a concept of Material Causality is, if not contradictory, at least problematic.  Now, in Modern Science and Philosophy, Matter is conceived as not inherently stable, e. g. evincing Repulsion and Attraction, or concrete Contradiction and Synthesis, for example.  But, that Attraction and Synthesis can each be classified as a Formal Cause indicates that Matter is still the locus of Causality, not itself Causal.  So, that 'material cause' is merely nominal persists, thereby opening the phrase to an analysis of its derivation.  But such an analysis exposes the underlying problem with the concept, a methodological problem that even Aristotle does not notice--no definition of 'Matter' any clearer than vague 'stuff'.  Now, the correction of that problem has been proposed here, beginning with the generally accepted concept of the Form-Matter relation as that of Unity-Multiplicity, from which can be derived the definition of Material Cause as Diversification.  The application of that definition to Biology has already been discussed, and concepts such as the Big Bang and expanding universe suggest applicability to Physics and Astronomy, as well.