Vital Need and Action

One of Marx's important insights is that the fulfilling of vital need can be not an end in itself, but a mere means to the toil of the next day.  Now, he seems to judge such a condition as sub-Human, on the grounds that one subjected to it cannot even enjoy simple satisfactions.  However, another reason for that deprivation derives not from a Utilitarian calculation, but from a different consequence, i. e. that to which the condition is a means--exploited toil.  For, equally spartan conditions can be deliberately adopted in a constructive context, e. g. by an athlete observing a strict regimen, in order to enhance performance.  Thus, the determining factor of the sub-Humanness of the condition that concerns Marx is that to which it is a means.  So, by shifting his attention to the deprivation of what the more privileged can enjoy, he misses a concept of behavior that Aristotle and Nietzsche better appreciate--that the fulfilling of need is a means to action, rather than the more commonly accepted converse.