Capitalism, Utilitarianism, Morality

Nietzsche's explicit dispute with Utilitarianism is one with Hedonism in general, i. e. with the thesis that Pleasure and Pain are intrinsically Good and Bad, respectively.  For, he observes that Pain can be a means to Good, e. g. Growth, and, hence, can be extrinsically Good, which is impossible according Hedonism, and disruptive of the Utilitarian calculus, which takes Pleasure and Pain at face value. However, he misses that the same applies to Pleasure, which becomes clearer when Satiation is distinguished from another kind of Pleasure--Excitation, which also is usually a Means to a further End, and, so, derives its Value from the latter, thereby exceeding the Utilitarian terminus.  Correspondingly, the accumulation of Wealth, ratified by Utilitarianism as 'Happiness', is subject to the challenge that its Value is contingent on the use to which it is put.  A familiar example of the soundness of that challenge is wealth used for militaristic purposes when vital needs are not being addressed.  Utilitarianism thus insulates Capitalism from any Moral challenge from rival Moral doctrines.