Egoism and Objectivity

By recognizing the existence of Sympathy, Smith implicitly rejects the Psychological Egoism of, notably, Hobbes, according to which some self-regarding goal is the only motive of behavior of an entity.  Instead, he advocates Moral Egoism, according to which one ought to act in one's own interest, overriding any concern for others. Now, his defense of that position is unstable--in some places, he argues that such behavior is a means to general Wealth, but, in others, perhaps recognizing that such a goal is non-Egoistic, argues, conversely, that any general Good is in one's own interest.  His floundering is a symptom of a more fundamental, inherent, flaw in Moral Egoism.  For, the assertion that one ought to do anything entails an appeal to some objective standard or authority.  But, to validate something, such as Self-Interest, by an appeal to a principle that transcends it, is to subordinate it to the latter, in which case something other than Egoism is the Moral doctrine being advocated.  Of course, asserting, as some Randians seem to do, that Egoism is itself the objective authority in question, is circular, and is equivalent to a reduction of Egoism to a fact, i. e. to Psychological Egoism.  So, neither variety of Egoism is tenable, regardless of how prominent it is in political rhetoric.