Atomism and Dehumanization

Because for the Atomist concept of the Psyche, all relations are external, it lacks grounds for distinguishing inhuman from human objects of experience, i. e. each is fundamentally a phenomenon in the world of such an entity.  Sympathy is no ground of that distinction--its occurrence is contingent, and, like any other painful feeling, functions as an impulse to modify the environs in some respect, in this case by eliminating some manifestations of woe by one of the objects therein.  In contrast, according to the Organicist concept of the Psyche, Humanness is part of the structure of the subject pole of experience, so, the treatment of another human as no different than an inanimate object is the result of abstracting from both their subjectivity and one's own humanity.  In other words, the dehumanization of others originates in the dehumanization of oneself.  The critiques of Hume, Capitalism, and Heidegger, by Kant, Socialists, and Levinas, respectively, each target, in varying ways, the objectification of others entailed by an Atomist concept of the Psyche.