Voluntary, Intentional, Formal Causality

In typical contemporary jurisprudential contexts, the Voluntary vs. Involuntary distinction is based on that of Intentional vs. Unintentional.  Now, an Intention is usually conceived as a representation of a goal that precedes the actualization of the goal.  But, while that concept of the distinction might suffice in the context, Determinists argue that the representation that is classified as an 'intention' actually has, at most, as little causal efficacy as a wish, so, rigorously considered, the distinction from Involuntary collapses.  However, the persistent flaw with that analysis, one which even Spinoza repudiates, is that an Intention is present only at the outset of a course of action.  Rather, as that Determinist proposes, the concept of a Circle is not merely present at the outset of the drawing of a Circle, but guides the process to completion.  Likewise, recipes, instructions, etc. are all common examples of a representation functioning as more than the expression of a wish.  In other words, the Causality that Determinists deny to an Intention is either Efficient or Teleological, when, in fact, it is Formal.  So, if Intentional is defined as entailing Self-Control, i. e. an instance of Formal Causality, the concept of Voluntary resists the Determinist objection to it.