Effort, Free Will, Determinism

Bergson presents Free Will as spontaneous yet durational "effort", the outcome beyond which is uncertain.  However, he vacillates between two further characterizations of this moment.  On the one hand, it is a "sui generis" self-sufficient "fact", akin to Lucretian Swerve and Existentialist Freedom.  But, on the other, the sequence is an effect of a "fundamental self", an entity which seems to both have a fixed noumenal character, and undergo constant modification.  Now, each concept thwarts Einsteinian Determinism, though, in the case of the second, not necessarily Schopenhauer's variety, according to which all behavior is the expression of, and, hence, is not free from, an immutable noumenal personality.  Now, the vacillation is typical of an uncertainty that persists throughout all the phases of Bergson's oeuvre.  For, the first of the accounts of Free Will entails a continuum between Consciousness and Body that is consistent with his later concept of a Spirit-Matter continuum, and that of an Evolutionary process in which the development of organs reflects that of Elan Vital. In contrast, the Self-Act split is consistent with Spirit-Matter and Elan Vital-organ dualisms that can also be read into his later works.  Accordingly, his privileging of incorporeal Spiritualism in his final main work, on Morality and Religion, retroactively commits him to the ultimate position that Free Will is not the observable fact of effort, but a hidden Causality originating in an in itself unobservable Self.  If so, then his position may escape Einsteinian Determinism, but not necessarily Schopenhauer's variety of it.