Determinism, Free Will, Self-Determinism

Newton's First Law is equivalent to the Detetminist principle that every Cause has a prior external Cause.  Bergson's counter-example, and example of Fre Will, is when a "fundamental self" is a Cause, thereby implying, but without explicit argument, that such a Cause has neither a prior nor external Cause. Thus, conspicuously absent from his presentation is any consideration of two prominent antecedents.  According to Spinoza, all behavior of the Fundamental Self is governed by Self-Persistence, and according to Schopenhauer, all behavior is an expression of both the fixed character of that Self, as well as the Will to Live.  Now, later, Bergson posits that Elan Vital is the source of all Motion, and, in Time and Free Will, casually accepts that a Self has a distinctive personality, so to reinforce the counter-example, he would need to argue that such influences are internal to and concurrent with anything it causes.  But, if so, then its Causality is more accurately classified as Self-Determinism, in contrast with Free Will qua Causality that is a singular event.