Will and Self-Restraint

'Will' is often applied to experiences of self-restraint, e. g. to resisting temptation. Interpreted as 'doing nothing', such cases seem to refute the thesis that has been advanced here, that Will consists in setting oneself in motion, i. e. because they involve the prevention of motion. But, such an interpretation confuses 'not doing X' with 'doing nothing', whereas resistance consists in the performance of an alternative to what is resisted, at minimum a continuation of what one had been doing prior to the possibility of doing X arising, e. g. an alcoholic does not merely not enter a liquor store but continues walking down the street. Even 'holding one's ground' is an expression of an effort in the direction contrary to that of what would move one, e. g. not fleeing in fear is exertion contrary to the direction of flight, not a 'doing nothing'. This analysis is especially crucial to Kant, for whom not acting on a forbidden maxim is an expression of 'freedom'. For, an expression of freedom in his system is the effect of a cause that is itself not the effect of a prior cause, but a non-event, such as 'not doing X', cannot be categorized as an effect of any kind. Rather, the expression of freedom can only be the course of action that ensues following the jettisoning of the forbidden maxim, even if it is completely irrelevant to the purposes that the maxim addresses. Perhaps more important are the practical consequences of this analysis of self-restraint, i. e. its diagnostic and prescriptive implications.