Successiveness and Causality

Kant defines Motion as 'alteration of location', and, accordingly, Time as 'successiveness'. Thus, neither differentiates between constant and inconstant velocity, a significant example of which is acceleration. Still, the notion of Successiveness can ground the specification of inconstant velocity, i. e. as 'a succession of successions', which, in turn, can ground the distinction between Cause and Effect. For an Effect, though not necessarily its Cause consists in a variation of velocity. Hence, insofar as one of the main ambitions of the Critique of Pure Reason is to counter Hume by distinguishing Cause from Effect, Kant can accomplish that without recourse to a logical category. The applicability of distinguishing Cause from Effect on the basis of possible constancy vs. necessary inconstancy is to such prominent examples of the former as Aristotle's circular motion, Einstein's particle moving at the speed of Light, and Kant's own Moral Law.