Reason and Volition

In recent Philosophy, the Rationalism-Empiricism debate of the 17th and 18th centuries has generally been cast as a topic in Epistemology, i. e. as pertaining to the nature of cognitive processes. But, for some of the thinkers of that era, the issue also, if not preeminently, concerns Volition. For example, for Spinoza, Will is rational, while for Hume, it is irrational. Consequently, while Kant explicitly seeks to mediate between their Epistemological differences, on the question of Volition, he seems initially to be siding with Spinoza, only to reluctantly eventually accept a neutral position between the latter's and Hume's. For, he first proposes that the mere consciousness of his Principle of Pure Practical Reason suffices to effect action in obedience to it, thereby equating Will and Reason. However, he is subsequently forced to systematically accommodate Hume's appreciation of the motivational power of sensory stimulation, i. e. Pleasure and Pain. So, to resolve this dilemma, apparently contrary to his original ambitions, he proposes a second notion of 'Will'--an elective Will that chooses between rational and irrational grounds of action, which he cannot avoid recognizing as a non-rational Will. Still, this elective Will falls short of isolating what has been argued here to be essential Will, i. e. executive Will, which is the effort to carry out some command, regardless of its source. In itself, this Will neither responds automatically to Reason, responds automatically to promises or threats, nor chooses between Reason and Unreason.