Intensity--Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze

Bergson argues that all quantities are extensive, so that intensities are only qualitative. Whitehead conceives Intensity as the feeling of contrast, which Bergson would seem to maintain as entailing simultaneity, and, hence, as entailing Extension. Deleuze proposes, implicitly against Bergson, that there are two kinds of magnitude--scalar and vectoral--and the latter, e. g. altitude, is successive and cumulative, not simultaneous and reversible. Hence, according to Deleuze, there is a species of of Magnitude, i. e. vectoral, which Intensity possesses, and, since for Whitehead, Concrescence is vectoral, Bergson's critique does not apply to its Intensity. However, rather than showing that there is a species of Magnitude that Bergson misses, Deleuze's example demonstrates that there is a mode of Extension of which he seems unaware. While the first hundred feet and the second hundred feet of an altitude are, for sure, not simultaneous and not exchangeable, the latter is an extension of the former. That is, the transition from the former to the latter is created by an active extending, that is distinct from the hypostasized concept of 'Extension' to which Deleuze, as well as Philosophy since Descartes, with the possible exception of Spinoza, subscribes. In other words, Intensity presupposes Extension, but not in the sense understood by Bergson, Whitehead, or Deleuze.