Deleuze, Purposiveness, Pragmatists

Deleuze asserts, in Empiricism and Subjectivity, that the concept of Practical Subjectivity entails the thought of an agreement between the course of Nature and the sequence of human ideas. By calling this thought 'Purposiveness', he distances this contention from both Kant, who uses the term differently, and Hume, who does not use it all. Thus, his citation of Hume elsewhere describing that agreement as "a kind of pre-established harmony" suggests that Deleuze's inspiration for it is, instead Leibniz, and, perhaps, Spinoza. In contrast, the pioneers of the priority of Practice, i. e. Peirce, James, and Dewey, reject the implication of such a thought in Praxis, instead proposing the fundamental Pragmatist thesis that Experience is an ongoing adjustment between Subject and environment. Dewey, in particular, appreciates the etymological kinship of 'empirical', 'experience', and 'experiment', all rooted in uncertain 'attempting'. Even Santayana's 'animal faith' in an accord between inner and outer experience is instinctual, not an explicitly articulated 'thought'. So, Deleuze's assertion that Purposiveness is entailed by Practical Subjectivity is, at best, questionable, and tends to underscore a chronic inattention to those Pragmatists that is unworthy of his otherwise astonishing erudition.