Deleuze, Difference, Identity

For Deleuze, Difference is independent of Identity. But, while in Difference and Repetition he exhaustively liberates Difference from its traditional subordination to Identity, the book offers little consideration of the status of Identity. Three general options seem open to him--Identity is subordinate to and derived from Difference, Identity is irreal, or Identity is independent from and covalent with Difference. Examples of the first possibility are from thinkers that Deleuze admires--Nietzsche and Bergson. For Nietzsche, Identity is Recurrence, while for Bergson, Identity is hypostasized Flux. However, both formulas suffer from the same inadequacy--they are question-begging, i. e. the former presupposes a distinction between Occurrence and Recurrence, and the latter presupposes that Flux can of its own accord lapse into stasis. In both cases, the presupposed thesis entails an ungrounded concept of Identity. One problem with the second option, which inverts Parmenides' thesis is that only The One is real, is similar to that of the first, namely, it leaves unexplained how even illusory Identity is derived from Difference. A deeper problem with it is that it does not explain how Difference does not instantaneously disintegrate the entire universe, which can only be prevented by some countervailing force that introduces coherence of some sort into reality. Thus, that Identity and Difference are independent, covalent, and possibly complementary principles, seems the most viable option, in the absence of which Deleuze's philosophy of Difference is as one-sided as the tradition that it seeks to overturn.