Moore, Good, and Definability

Moore asserts that 'the Good is indefinable'. Given that numerous definitions of 'the Good' have been offered, the assertion is plainly false, if by 'indefinable', he means 'impossible to physically define'. Now, his main argument against many of those definitions is that they entail 'naturalistic' properties, whereas the Good is 'non-natural'. Such an argument is, at best, inconclusive, because it implies a distinction between 'natural' and 'non-natural' that can only beg the question. He is also open to the response that 'indefinable' could mean nothing more than 'has yet to be defined', implying that Moore's assertion is indistinguishable from 'I have thus far failed to define the Good'. More problematic is that his thesis fails to distinguish between 'the Good is indefinable' and my Good is indefinable', i. e. that what others take to be 'the Good' is, in fact, a case of mistaken identity. If so, then his thesis does not establish the universality of what he calls 'Good'. So, his best explanation of his thesis is that 'the Good' is simple and sui generis, whereas Definition entails a plurality of components, at least some of which are general properties. In other words, for Moore, 'the Good' is a name that he attaches to a certain phenomenon in his experience. Because of the opacity of his experience, it is indeterminable whether or not that phenomenon can also be termed 'Harmony', in which case it would be non-naturalistically definable, i. e. as 'a suitablity of whole to parts'. Regardless, a further question is whether or not Moore also subscribes to the thesis that 'Indefinabilty is Good'. Given that indefinability is, at minimum, according to him, a characteristic of Goodness, it cannot be Bad. And, for one of the founders of Analytic Philosophy, atomic entities do have an honorific status. In any case, it follows from 'the Good is indefinable' that 'definability is not necessarily Good', which seems difficult to defend without begging some question.