Idea, Ideal, Role

One of the most venerable Philosophical notions, 'Idea', has also had one of the most confusing histories. For example, in some Systems, the realm of 'Ideas' is synonymous with 'Reality', while in others, they are antithetical. In its perhaps most basic meaning, 'Idea' is synonymous with 'pattern', and, hence, with 'Form', which is why Plato's 'Forms' are often also called 'Ideas'. Since, for Plato, Forms actually exist, while the transitory physical realm does not, 'Ideas' are 'real' in Platonism. However, in other Systems, a 'form' is a mere abstraction from a concrete entity, so an 'idea' is irreal in them. Compounding the confusion is that the some Idea-Realists, notably Plato, believe that Ideas exist independently of any mind, while for others, e. g. Spinoza, they are constituents of either a divine or human mind. Lost in this complicated history is the original synonymity of two terms that have become generally accepted as distinct: Idea and Ideal. In both contemporary scholarly and common usage, 'Ideal' has a normative connotation that 'Idea' does not have. The genesis of their divergence is unclear, but as late as in Kant's System, both Idea and Ideal are products of Reason, though both of non-normative theoretical Reason. In contrast, for Plato they are univocal, and normative. For, a Platonic Idea is essentially a perfect entity, an archetype for things that participate in it, and, hence, is the best of a type, e. g. all particular dogs participate in the Idea of Dog, the exemplification of perfect Dogness. On that basis, 'Ideal' is primarily nothing but the adjectival form of 'Idea', so, 'an Ideal', is nothing more than a reification of the property of being 'an Idea'. So, a Platonist explanation of the normative dimension of social role-playing, i. e. that what one tries to be is a 'good husband', 'good wife', 'good citizen', etc., is that role-descriptions are Ideas, the fulfillment of which can be better or worse, i. e. closer to or further from perfection.