Definition and Ordinality

Under the most common circumstances, a 'definition' is sought to clarify the meaning of an unfamiliar expression that emerges in discourse. Hence, in such circumstances, the definition of Definition as 'a more familiar expression that is equivalent to a less familiar expression' is adequate. However, it is inapplicable to other efforts to define a term. To the contrary, as seen in Plato's attempt to define 'Justice', and in Aristotle's, for 'Happiness', it is the definiendum which is familiar, and the definiens which is unknown. Furthermore, the common notion does not explicitly accommodate the function of Definition in theoretical projects--to serve as a basis for further definitions. Nor is it adequate to the neological process, in which a new term is offered both to represent a discovered pattern and to found further discourse. The latter case reveals Definition to be analogous to Counting, in which a unit is offered both to homogenize some manifold and to found subsequent enumeration. In other words, Definition is linguistic Ordinality, a characteristic which is usually only implicit in more common circumstances.