Supject, Predicate, and Evolvement

A Theory of Language is typically divided into studies of Semantics and of Syntax. The former is concerned with Meaning, while the latter, more commonly known as Grammar, proposes structural rules for sentence formation. But Syntax is never completely removed from the problem of Meaningfulness, as can be seen in the Systematic commitments of the basic Subject-Predicate formation. For Aristotle, that ordering reflects the Substance-Attribute structure of all entities, while for Kant, it conforms to the Permanent-Temporary construction of Proposotional Knowledge. In contrast, Nietzsche and Bergson, for example, argue that such Syntax falsifies the world that Language tries to describe, as, e. g. 'Lightning strikes' artificially divides a unitary process into a subsisting Subject and something that it momentarily does. Evolvementalism agrees with Aristotle and Kant that regarding Individuals, the Subject precedes the Predicate. However, it agrees with Nietzsche and Bergson that a transition occurs in the event described. In 'John runs', 'John' refers to an Individual, and 'runs', to an Action of his. But this Action transforms the initial 'John' to one who is identical, except with the additional experience as now part of him. So, traditional Syntax is not adequate to Evolvemental processes.