Consciousness and Behavior

According to the theory of 'Consciousness' being advocated here, all awareness is fundamentally self-awareness, meaning that it is fundamentally an intra-organic process. In more common jargon, the 'consciousness of outer objects' is mediated by the consciousness of local corporeal processes, i. e. the 'consciousness of redness and roundness' is actually the 'consciousness of looking at something red and round'. This inverts the classical Empiricist thesis that knowledge begins with impressions of the outer world. But the challenge to Empiricism is not merely 'Epistemological', as would seem to be the case from standard classifications in Academia. For example, that Locke's notion of 'Tabula Rasa' has significance to both Epistemology and Political Philosophy can hardly be grasped where those two subjects are taught in entirely different Departments, by those with different areas of expertise. More to the immediate point here, despite their being systematically presented in one and the same book, the connections between Hume's Empiricism and his theory of behavior seem rarely to receive attention in Academia. Those connections were hardly new with Hume. To the contrary, they are as traditional as Aristotle, who argues that motivation begins with some sensory stimulus. So, if a sensory stimulus is ultimately, directly or indirectly, from without, then behavior can only be a response to something external. Thus, an alternative theory of 'Consciousness' will entail a challenge to the Empiricist theory of Behavior.