Conscience

From the preceding, it can be demonstrated how embodied, or otherwise, Consciousness is identical to Conscience. While the homeostatic functioning of Consciousness is similar to the typical experience of Conscience, that the latter involves a correction of personal behavior towards others, would seem contrary to the intrapersonal nature of the former. But, as Heidegger has argued, the essence of Conscience is its intrapersonal structure, a 'call' from within, not whatever value system the call happens to serve as a surrogate. Less obviously homeostatic is the concept of Consciousness as a disembodied observer. But Kant's demonstration of how Reason is implicity Practical analogously applies to Consciousness. For, as disembodied, Consciousness is also impersonal, and as an impersonal visitor to a personal Body, it, in itself, constrains corporeal behavior, that is, serves as its Conscience, which is brought out much more plainly when Consciousness and Soul are presented as identical. Even when Aristotle distinguished Practical Intellect from Theoretical, and subordinated it to the latter, he did not mean to distinguish Conscience from Consciousness. For, in his system, thought-thinking-itself is a higher Good than thought-influencing-conduct, and, hence, a more fundamental source of Conscience, not an intellectual process of a different type. Here is exposed Aristotle's allegiance to Plato's doctrine that Contemplation of the Form of the Good is a higher Good than conduct in accordance with the latter. What the Individualistic concept of Conscience primarily rejects in the Platonic tradition is that the 'recollection' of Form is more important than the original collection of localized corporeal movements that first constitute their Form.