For Me and In-Itself

The concept of "for me" is opposed to that of "in-itself". While the former connotes that the contents of Consciousness are entirely private, the latter connotes that those contents, or, more properly, the objects, of Consciousness are independent of it. Thus, the contrast is one of Appearance and Reality, and the classifications of the two concepts of Consciousness are Phenomenalist and Realist, respectively, with Phenomenological one variation of the former. So, the attractiveness of the "for me" concept to Marxism, probably via Hegel, is that it can be a safeguard against Ideology, insofar as in the latter, Appearance is presented as Reality. However, in their adoption of that concept, Marx-Engels seem to overlook its potentially reactionary features, stemming from its initial introduction by Locke, i. e. Secondary Qualities, which are privately experienced. Accordingly, Berkeley's radicalization of that category eliminates all commonality, i. e. Locke's Primary Qualities, from social life, while retaining one characteristic--that of Consciousness as a mere observer of its contents/objects. Furthermore, as Spinoza best understands, Phenomenalists are naive about the presumed opacity of the "for me"--about how it can be the product of heteronomous inclinations, i. e. that it can be an expression of externally determined prejudices. So, in sum, the concept of Consciousness that Marx-Engels adopt is one of selfishness and idleness, i. e. that of the Capitalist.