Will, Theory, Practice

In #53 of World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer asserts that "all philosophy is always theoretical", and that it ought to "abandon" any effort to become practical.  Now, granting him a Theory-Practice contrast that he seems to presuppose, and overlooking the arbitrariness of his choosing the former over the latter, it can be accepted that the following are in the purview of Theory:  his proposed distinction between Representation and Will; the propositions that the Will-to-Live can be affirmed, and can be denied; and, the arguments in support of the affirmation, and in support of the denial, of the Will-to-Live.  However, to affirm, and to deny, are, themselves, each practical acts, not theoretical propositions.  Thus, Schopenhauer's affirmation of a doctrine of the denial of the Will-to-Live, even granting that its internal incoherence--i. e. it both affirms and denies--is 'paradoxical', not 'contradictory', is outside the purview of Philosophy, on his own definition of it.