Representation and Mimesis

Schopenhauer conceives Representation as entailing a unity of subject and object, with respect to which rival theories are generally one-sided, i. e. they privilege either one or the other, with supporting argumentation thereby basically idle.  However, perhaps because in his system the primary function of that concept is as a stage of detachment from individuality, he does not pursue alternate explanations of that apparent unity.  For example, a clue to one such alternative is in the experience of Music that is other than the one that he privileges, i. e. in dancing, as opposed to his Contemplation.  For, dancing is a fundamentally mimetic response to Music, from which it can be inferred that so, too, is Contemplation mimetic, and, hence, that Representation, in general, is mimetic.  That is, Mimesis entails both subject-object similarity, and subject-object dissimilarity, the systematization of which is the basis of every theory of Representation, including Schopenhauer's, which is Mimesis that privileges subject-object similarity.  However, Schopenhauer must reject such a theory, not on its own merits, but because it undermines the possibility, in Contemplation, of detachment from individuality that is central to his program.