Two Noumenal Wills

At first glance, the "painful yearning" for peace, that Schopenhauer, in #71 of World as Will and Representation, attributes to Will-lessness, seems, to the contrary, only another expression of Will.  However, closer analysis suggests that the characterization is a perhaps unwitting moment in the untangling of a conflation that hitherto significantly besets his system.  For, to identify Will-to-Live with a "striving" that "springs from want or deficiency", as Schopenhauer does in #56, is to imply that only Need motivates Will.  However, an instinct to procreate that is indifferent to the possibility of over-population can hardly be characterized as one that 'springs from want or deficiency', and, yet, can only be an expression of Will.  In other words, in some cases, there is a conatus to continue vital processes, while in others, there is a nisus towards a cessation of them--two distinct noumenal Wills, mutually independent.  It is these two that he conflates under the rubric 'Will-to-Live', until he begins to extract from it the latter will, i. e. the 'yearning for peace'.  Accordingly, his system is exposed in #71 as entailing two noumenal Wills, with his moral doctrine consisting of the privileging of one of them.