Will and Character

In ch. III of On the Freedom of the Will, Schopenhauer describes "character" as "individual", "empirical", and "inborn", and in ch. V as the "appearance of the intelligible character".  However, the relation between the empirical character and the intelligible character is unclear.  For, in #55 of WWR, the latter is inconsistently both "the will in itself", and "his", i. e. is both universal, and a specified type of character that is individuated, each possibility of which is, furthermore, problematic for his system.  On the one hand, if specification and individuation are only empirical, then the inborn constancy of Character is difficult to explain.  On the other, that they are intelligible conflicts with the cardinal thesis of his system, that differentiation is only phenomenal.  Now, especially given that they are, in principle, unverifiable, jettisoning the attributions of Innateness and Constancy to Character seems to be the resolution of this incoherence that is least damaging to the integrity of the system.  Still, it would not explain his examples of Asceticism, in which, as constituted by Will-lessness, Character exists, but Will does not.