Soul, Will, Character

Since 'Soul' is traditionally defined as 'animating principle', 'Will' is Schopenhauer's version of Soul. Thus, his unsettled question as to whether or not individual intelligible Character is differentiated a priori, is a repeat of the Medieval debate over whether individual Soul is an instance of the universal Soul, or is an a priori specification of it.  In contrast, Plato, at least in The Republic, avoids the apparent inconsistency, by presenting the individual as innately a member of a political class, which entails that the individual Soul is an instance of an a priori differentiation of the general Soul.  However, that resolution is of no use to Schopenhauer, since in his system, the divisions of the Soul are only 'objectifications' of Will.  Thus, his concept of Character is therein exposed as more closely aligned with the Medieval concept of Soul, which, likewise, rejects the Platonist intra-psychic differentiation, despite his professed allegiance to Plato in some passages.