Contemplation, Pleasure, Mimesis

Schopenhauer's concept of Contemplation, as effecting a detachment from individuality, puts his Aesthetic theory at a disadvantage to Kant's in two respects.  First, he sacrifices the possibility of explaining Aesthetic pleasure, because pleasure is private, subjective, individual, phenomenal, and even illusory, according to his system.  Second, the structural simplicity of Contemplation, according to his concept of it, leaves him no room to accommodate any interplay of Understanding and Imagination that might constitute it, according to Kant's.  In contrast, a Mimetic theory of Representation, as previously proposed here, in which the Contemplation of an art object involves an imitation of its internal structural interplay, as well as an interplay of similarity and dissimilarity between subject and object, does accommodate pleasurable play.  It does so by maintaining what is inimical to not only Schopenhauer's concept of Contemplation, but to his entire doctrine--a difference of subject of representation from object of representation, even as they appear to coincide.