Action and Freedom

Purportedly following Kant, Schopenhauer presents two alternative, but compossible, models of human behavior.  In one, a specific act is a response to an empirical motive, while in the other, it is an individuating appearance of the intelligible character of the agent.  So, despite their profound differences, the models agree that an act is always predetermined, and, hence, is never 'free'.  However, neither model recognizes the fundamental behavioral discontinuity that, as has been previously discussed here, constitutes the transition from a mental datum, e. g. a decision, to any motility, even to mere effort.  The radical heterogeneity of that transition is not eliminated by either theories that ignore it, interpretations that gloss over it, or habit-formations that minimize it.  In other words, classifying an act as a 'response', 'individuation', or 'phenomenon' is inadequate to its excession beyond any of its preconditions.  Indeed, it is this 'freedom' from any antecedent, empirical, or intelligible, that distinguishes self-denial from mere inaction.