Character, Responsibility, Ressentiment

In the traditional 'Free Will vs. Determinism' debate, a standard defense of the former position is that if it were incorrect, the ascription of Responsibility would be impossible, i. e. because the ultimate cause of an action would always lie elsewhere.  In contrast, in ch. III of On the Freedom of Will, Schopenhauer idiosyncratically marshals that rationale in support of his seemingly diametrically opposed concept of fixed innate Character:  "Thus, when the freedom of will is assumed, we see that the origin of the difference in behavior, and therewith of virtue or vice, together with responsibility, floats adrift and nowhere finds a place to take root."  So, regardless of the relative merits of the two arguments, they share an appeal to an accepted validity of the concept of Responsibility as the decisive factor.  Now, Nietzsche traces the traditional concept of Responsibility to Ressentiment, i. e. diagnosis it as Blame as a vicarious weapon of the weak.  Furthermore, Schopenhauer does not seem to explicitly consider that another premise that leaves the concept of personal Responsibility rootless is the thesis that universal Will is the sole noumenon, and, hence, is the source of all behavior, including 'vice'.  Accordingly, he is vulnerable to the suspicion that his seemingly incoherent classification of individual Character as 'innate', and, hence, as 'noumenal', is an expression of conventional Ressentiment.