Representation and Causality

Though Schopenhauer, in WWR, introduces Representation as given, he elsewhere subscribes to a Causal theory of Perception, in terms of which Representation is a derived experience.  He explicitly advocates that theory in Fourfold Root, e. g. in #22, and implicitly does so in WWR, with the thesis that all experiences are resultants of Will interacting with Will.  Now, if Representation consists in a subject being affected by an outer Object, as the theory entails, then it constitutes a modification of the Subject, and, hence, of its Will.  Accordingly, a Platonic Idea is no more than the object of a representation of a subjective modification, i. e. is an abstraction from the latter.  In other words, Schopenhauer is mistaken in attributing to Contemplation a detachment from Will, i. e. the feeling of 'absorption in the object' is, rather, an internal overpowering, by an external cause, which is one's Will being affected in a certain way