Will, Consciousness, Homeostasis

Because 'cyberspace' is often associated with the 'information highway', the segment 'cyber' seems equivalent to 'information'. However, 'cyber' has the same root as 'govern', and the ancestor of 'cyberspace', 'cybernetics' was originally coined to indicate the homeostatic capacity of systems, i. e. that they can self-correct. A similar misdirection has tended to beset theories of Consciousness over the centuries--what primarily serves a homeostatic function in an organism is often interpreted as playing an data-processing role. By retaining what, in itself, effects a rupture with its antecedent conditions, Consciousness is, fundamentally, a homeostatic complement to Will, which introduces that discrescence into Experience. This concept of Consciousness is not completely idiosyncratic--Kant, recognizes that Consciousness unifies the experiential manifold, but he falls short of considering that that manifold is primarily produced by the motile dimension of Experience, i. e. by Will. As has been previously discussed, the Retaining effected by Consciousness, interiorizes ongoing Motility, thereby transforming its moments into incomplete phases of a complete process, and, hence, unifying what had been a manifold. So, what Consciousness retains, first and foremost, is not experiential information, but the subject of Will, which, in itself, indefinitely extends beyond previously settled experiential episodes.

Will and Transcendence

The superiority of one realm to another in traditional hierarchical Dualisms often consists in asymmetrical causality, i. e. the superior realm can affect the inferior, but not vice versa. One expression of such asymmetry is the thesis that the idea of a transcendent realm can be experienced by a human only if the idea originates in that transcendent realm, so that that very idea can be taken as proof of the existence of its object. Accordingly, even Levinas' Outer-Inner Dualism is hierarchical, respectively, because, for him, transcendent Exteriority can only be passively experienced by Interiority. In contrast, in Formaterialism, the Material Principle of Experience, Will, is the mundane process of the surpassing of the given. In other words, Will is Transcendence, i. e. in Formaterialism, Transcendence has an immanent origin.

Will and Detachment

Will, in Formaterialism, is the principle of Diversification in Experience--the generation of an indefinite novel Otherwise. It is Will, in its earliest phase, that is traditionally characterized as the 'detachment' that for many doctrines is the cardinal philosophical moment. However, lacking an appreciation for the fundamentality of Diversification in Experience, these systems can only interpret that moment as a transition to a transcendent 'nowhere', rather than to a previously non-existent otherwise. Hence, the dualisms that are constructed to accommodate such a nowhere, e. g. in order to locate it in a metaphysical realm, are based on an abstraction from a more mundane experiential process.

Will and Binary Subjectivity

Formaterialism consists of two fundamental principle--the Material Principle, i. e. the process of Becoming-Diverse, and the Formal Principle, i. e. the process of Becoming-the-Same. In the sphere of personal experience, these principles are Will and Consciousness, respectively. In the former, the initial moment is I, while in the latter, the terminal moment is I. Hence, Formaterialism entails what can be called 'binary subjectivity', because each I is fundamentally a moment in a distinct subjective function, in terms of which hypostasization, abstraction, and homogenization produce the more familiar unitary 'I' of traditional theories. Three prominent theories that wrestle with binary subjectivity are Kant's, with both a theoretical and a practical subject; Whitehead's, with its subject-superject dichotomy; and, Sartre's, in which Consciousness both is aware of its object and is a flight from it. However, none of these offers a satisfactory systematization of it.

Will and I

On Kant's analysis, the I of the 'I think' is the source of the unity of Consciousness. On Whitehead's innovative variation, the I only emerges at the end of the Concrescence that produces 'I am conscious of X', i. e. it is a novel I, not either one that precedes the process, or one that remains identical throughout it. Furthermore, for Whitehead, every new I, in turn, becomes a constituent in a subsequent Concrescence that generates a newer I. Now, as has been previously discussed here, Whitehead neglects the discrescent moment that ensues upon the completion of one Concrescence and eventuates in a subsequent Conscrescence. In other words, he does not recognize the I which originates Discrescence. In Formaterialism, experiential Discrescence is Will, so what Whitehead does not recognize is the I that is the initial moment of Will.

Will and Referring

Will, on the definition here, is Motility that exceeds one's perceived given situation. One motile process is uttering. Some utterances are referential, i. e. they indicate some object of which one was aware prior to one's issuing of them. Hence, Referring entails Will. A similar analysis applies to Describing.

Will and Empiricism

The standard definition of 'Empiricism' is 'the theory that all Knowledge originates in the senses'. However, the etymological root of 'empirical' is 'to attempt', so, a more literal definition of it, as perhaps Dewey best understands, is 'the theory of experimental knowledge'. Now, every experiment is an active departure from antecedent conditions that both seeks new knowledge and puts established knowledge at risk. But, the experiential principle that exceeds the given, as has been discussed, is Will. Hence, Empiricism, properly conceived, originates in Will, in the modes of active motile processes, such as looking at, listening to, touching, etc., from which the passive 'senses' of traditional 'Empiricism' are abstracted.