Religion, Morality, Certainty

Even the most rudimentary Religion involves two theoretical propositions--one pertaining to the effects of a deity on humans, and the other, the converse.  The first can be classified as 'Theology', the second, as 'Morality'.  Now, in even those rudimentary situations, there is an interplay of Theology and Morality--practices that are designed to influence a deity are determined by propositions regarding the latter, though, as, ultimately, a means to Moral ends, i. e. human goods.  Thus, Dewey's thesis that Philosophy emerges from Religion in Ancient Greece, as an improved 'quest for Certainty', by replacing primitive Theology with highly refined Metaphysics, misses its radical divergence with respect to Moral theory.  The Euthyphro formulates this divergence precisely--Piety is independent of Theology--from which it follows that Morality is, as well.  Aristotle codifies this independence by establishing Certainty, achieved in 'Thought thinking itself', as the Highest Good,  This status of Certainty is implicitly re-affirmed by Kant, under the rubric 'apodictic necessity', the ultimate criterion of his Moral theory.  Still, Dewey never quite seems to recognize Certainty as a Moral, rather than as an Epistemological, principle.  So, while his proposal that Probability replace it, with respect to the pursuit of Knowledge, is compelling, he remains vague about the implications of that replacement for Morality and Religion, e. g. while suggesting general modifications of religious practices, he does not seem to address the continued prevalent recognition of a deity that offers Certainty in the guise of Omnipotence, Eternity, etc.