Will and Spinozism

Spinozism rejects the concept of Will that is being presented here, seemingly on the grounds that setting oneself in motion is an illusory process. However, on closer examination, the apparent personal freedom that Spinoza targets as illusory is, specifically, teleological motility, on the grounds that an intention that seems to initiate action is itself the effect of a prior cause, a diagnosis that does not apply to a non-teleological process such as Will. What Spinozism does reject is the violation of its Parallelism, i. e. that Will originates in Mind and eventuates in Body. However, that Parallelism entails the simultaneity of the idea of a physical movement and its object, which is disproved by more recent physiological analysis, i. e. by the discovery of a time-lapse between a cerebral signal and its corresponding motor activity. Furthermore, Spinoza's recognition of only Efficient Causality precludes any appreciation of a process, such as Will, that is categorized as a Material Cause. So, at best, Spinozism offers no compelling argument against this concept of Will.